The Hampton Roads Peace Conference
How about a little history this time. This is something I learned about only a few months ago but which I found very interesting. What follows is the information I presented as the program for my Sons of Confederate Veterans meeting last week.The Hampton Roads Peace Conference
I. Introduction
I was totally ignorant of this conference until January of this year when I read this column on the Lew Rockwell web site, "The Hampton Roads Peace Conference During the War Between the States" by John V. Denson. I believe it had earlier appeared on one of the League of the South sites.
February 1865. Why a conference this late in the war? Without a doubt the South was on its last legs. What bargaining power did we have? What might the North be willing to concede? After all, the North’s only justification for war was that this was a rebellion. It’s very unlikely they would deal with the Confederate government. And what brought such high level participants to Hampton Roads?
I found this story very interesting.
The two main sources of information, since no written record of this "informal" meeting was allowed, were Abraham Lincoln’s report to congress and the book, A Constitutional View of the War Between the States: Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results by Alexander Hamilton Stephens, written a few years after the war. The Houston downtown library has a copy of Stephens’ book but I wasn’t able to make it down there so I’m depending upon quotes from it from the Denson article and a book entitled Alexander H. Stephens, A Biography by Thomas Edwin Schott.
To begin, to pick up some background, let’s back up a few years and look further south, south to Mexico.
II. Mexico
A rebellion in 1854 toppled Santa Anna’s last administration and resulted in a new constitution in 1857. But afterward turmoil continued, and a civil war raged for the next three years, the "War of the Reform." Its winners were the so-called "Liberals" led by Benito Juarez. The losers, the "Conservatives" wouldn’t you know, had been backed by the Catholic church. To the victors go the spoils and these victors decreed confiscation of all church assets save the church buildings themselves. During and after the war all foreign assets were seized as well. By 1862 reparations were being demanded, but the treasury was still empty.
With los Norte Americanos immersed in our own war, Britain, Spain and France mounted an expedition to seize Vera Cruz and compel payment. But, when France under Napoleon III decided to take over Mexico, Britain and Spain pulled out. Though suffering some reverses along the way, the French took Mexico City and installed Ferdinand Maxmilian of Hapsburg, the younger brother of Franz Joseph, emperor of Austria, to rule. His good-looking wife Carlotta, a Belgian princess, accompanied Maxmilian.
This violation of the Monroe Doctrine did not set well up North.
Enter Francis P. Blair, Sr.
III. Blair
Known as "Father Blair," he founded the Washington Globe in 1830 and, in 1856, was a co-founder of the Republican Party. Blair had a home in Washington and an estate in Maryland. The Washington house is the famous "Blair House" where President Truman was living temporarily at the time Puerto Rican nationalists tried to assassinate him.
Years before, while still a Democrat, he had been one of President Andrew Jackson’s famous "kitchen cabinet." Now he was an unofficial advisor to President Lincoln. At the beginning of 1865 he was an energetic 73 year-old.
Blair Sr. had one son, Montgomery, who was U.S. Postmaster General and another, Major General Francis P. Blair, Jr., who commanded a corps under Sherman in Georgia.
Convinced that he could reunite North and South by proposing a joint campaign to throw the French out of Mexico, Blair was able to obtain permission from Lincoln to pass through the lines in order to present his proposal to Jefferson Davis. While not enamored with the Mexican thing, Lincoln did write a short letter granting passage. (28 Dec. 1864.) Blair was not given any authority to speak for the U.S. government.
IV. Negotiating to Negotiate
After meeting with President Davis on 12 Jan., Blair returned to Washington with a letter from him, which concluded, "… That notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries."
In his report to congress, referring to the Davis letter, Lincoln wrote, "Afterward, and with the view that it should be shown to Mr. Davis, I wrote and delivered to Mr. Blair a letter, as follows, to wit:
WASHINGTON, January 18, 1865
F. P. BLAIR, Esq.:
SIR: Your having shown me Mr. Davis’ letter to you of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our common country.
Yours, &c.
A. Lincoln"
On the twenty-third Blair was back in Richmond bearing the above letter. No one missed the point that the conclusion of Lincoln’s letter referred to the ending of Davis’. Obviously, there was a major problem here.
I won’t attempt to go into the political situation in Richmond at the time. For one thing, I’m not up on the details. Suffice it to say that at this stage of the war, President Davis wasn’t all that popular. As some sage said, "Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is a bastard." Or did he say "an orphan?" At any rate, Vice President Alexander Hamilton Stephens was considered a rival, which is likely the very reason Davis chose him to head the commission Lincoln had written that he would accept. The other two were to be Robert M. T. Hunter, President pro tem. of the Senate and Judge John A. Campbell, formerly a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Stephens hadn’t wanted to be a part of this. In fact, he had suggested three names himself, only one of which Davis selected. However, once a part, Stephens became enthusiastic, really hoping that something could be accomplished.
V. On to Ft. Monroe
Authorized by a letter from Jefferson Davis, the commission headed toward Yankee lines, both by rail and carriage. But when they arrived, they were totally unexpected. Telegrams shot back and forth from Headquarters Ninth U.S. Corps to HQ, Army of the James to HQ, Army of the Potomac to Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War. Stanton spoke with President Lincoln and the men were to be allowed to cross.
"When the confederates crossed the shell-pocked no-man’s-land between the lines, men on both sides stood up, waved their hats, and yelled, ‘Peace! Peace!’ at the top of their lungs." (Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, 31 Jan. 1865.)
They were held at General Grant’s headquarters until a Major Thomas T. Eckert arrived from Washington with Lincoln’s specific orders as to whether their mission would be allowed to continue. The basis would be Lincoln’s letter of 18 Jan. to Blair, i.e., the "our common country" letter. That day the president had sent Secretary of State William Seward to Ft. Monroe, near Hampton Roads, to meet with the delegation. He, too, was given detailed instructions. Again the basis was the 18 Jan. 18 letter. Three "indispensable" points were detailed and Seward was not given authority to consummate anything.
At Grant’s headquarters Maj. Eckert decided the instructions Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell carried from President Davis did not meet the requirements of his orders. Neither did a rewrite attempt. General Grant was very much in favor of this conference and began to lose patience. Finally, he took matters into his own hands. He sent the men on to Ft. Monroe on his own authority aboard the steamer Mary Martin where Secretary already awaited them, and sent Stanton a telegram detailing what he had done. Stanton passed this on to Lincoln.
Why did Lincoln decide personally to attend? Apparently it was due to Grant’s telegram. In it he remarked about the sincerity of the men and, in a way, suggested that Lincoln meet with them. Lincoln also wired Grant not to delay any planned operations due to the conference.
The meeting took place aboard Lincoln’s steamer (would that be Navy One?) on 3 Feb. 1865.
VI. The Conference Itself
Did any real possibility exist for some meeting of the minds or, after all this, was the conference doomed to be only anti-climax?
Things began cordially enough. Lincoln and Stephens, old compatriots from Whig party days, spent a few minutes talking over old times and asking of old acquaintances. But once the meeting got down to business it was apparent that not much of a positive nature was going to come forth.
The meeting was truly informal. In Lincoln’s own words, "No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned; no other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely."
Early on Lincoln stated that he had no interest in halting the war in order to take military action in Mexico. That was Blair’s thing, he said. And there would be no agreements entered into with the authorities of the Confederate states because that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate power. The same held true for individual states.
He also stated that he had no objection to discussing a peace offer as long as the first condition would be for the Confederacy to pledge to rejoin the union immediately. After that other details could be worked out. And there would be no cessation of hostilities without a pledge.
Okay, what terms could be expected following such a pledge? Judge Campbell asked. There was no immediate response so they moved on to other items. Some things along this line came up later, though.
Stephens asked about Southern representation in congress. Lincoln’s reply was that they would have their full rights restored under the constitution. This implied there would be no punishment or reconstruction. As to individuals, Lincoln promised liberal use of his power of pardon.
Slavery, of course, came up and was discussed at length. Lincoln insisted that anyone freed under the Emancipation Proclamation would not be re-enslaved. Mr. Seward pointed out that was only about 200,000 out of several million. What about the status of the others? Lincoln said the Proclamation was a war measure and as soon as the war ceased, it would become inoperative; however, the courts would likely decide some of these issues.
Secretary Seward brought up that a proposed thirteenth amendment forbidding slavery had just passed the U.S. House of Representatives. Lincoln then said that while slavery was doomed, he felt that the North would be willing to be taxed to some extent to provide for compensated emancipation. He figured that maybe $ 400 million or about 15% of 1860 value would be possible.
Earlier Seward had waxed eloquent on how a nation could not exist for long if secession were legal. Mr. Hunter, a Virginian, brought up a final secession question. Would Virginia get West Virginia back? West Virginia had seceded from Virginia over a year before and became a U.S. state. This answer was not long in coming. No! Apparently some secessions were more acceptable than others.
After four hours the conference broke up. The delegates left for home without much to feel optimistic about. Their written report to the president also reflected these feelings.
VII. What If
Would it have made a significant difference had Southern leaders taken this offer, such as it was? Now we know things could not have possibly been any worse than they turned out.
Could Lincoln be trusted to follow through on what he said about congressional representation, pardons and such?
And, more importantly, did he have the power and influence needed? After all, there were a lot of vindictive people, people with a lot of power, in the U.S. congress.
But, maybe history might have changed for the better somewhat.
Who knows?

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